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One of the great strengths of Friemann’s paper on reducing conflict is the emphasis he puts 
on emotions and emotion-laden states.  The presentation of argumentation and dialectical 
disagreement given by most philosophers treats arguers as if they were emotionless, or as if they 
should be. For example, of the 66 papers at this OSSA Conference only 3 or 4 consider emotion-
laden states in an important way. Yet it is hard to find many examples of actual-world 
argumentation and dialectical reasoning where emotions do not play a strong part. 
1. 
The central focus of Friemann’s paper is the concept of identification (or fusion).  Friemann 
traces a theme in the recent literature on reducing or resolving deep conflicts: for a dialogue to 
develop in deep conflicts, so this theme runs, participants should empathize with one another, at 
least as far as possible.  They should not, on the other hand, go so far as to identify with one 
another.  Identification, in contrast to empathy, is a dangerous state of mind to develop. 
Friemann traces this mistrust of identification back to its roots in therapy, to Carl Rogers and 
others.  It is the dangers of identification that Friemann wants to question. 
In opposition to this theme, Friemann maintains that in deep conflicts, between ordinary 
people, identification is not appreciably dangerous at all.  The fact that the conflict is a deep one, 
and that it occurs between ordinary people (rather than between therapist and client), are central 
parts of Friemann’s position.  In such conflicts, Friemann argues, the chances that identification 
will occur are very slim.  Rather, identification is an ideal that participants should aspire to—
even if it is unlikely (because their conflicts are so deep) that they will ever succeed in 
identifying (or fusing) with the other. 
Friemann begins in a therapeutic setting and spells out what is meant by identification.  He 
does this by contrasting it with empathy: It is helpful, maybe essential, for a therapist to 
empathize with her client; it is dangerous, maybe harmful, for a therapist to identify with her 
client. 
What is the difference between the two?  I hope you already have an intuitive grasp of the 
difference, because spelling out that difference will be one focus of my commentary. 
Friemann goes on: The relationship that holds between ordinary people who are locked in 
deep conflict is entirely different from the relationship that holds between therapists and patients. 
It is difficult enough for people in deep disagreements even to empathize with one another; they 
are extremely unlikely to identify with one another.  So there is very little danger of 
identification actually occurring.  Therefore, it should be held up as a goal or ideal in those 
situations. 
Near the end of his paper, Friemann even offers some practical techniques that might help a 
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I want to focus on two aspects of Friemann’s paper, and as part of the second one, I am 
going to conclude that Friemann is wrong.  I will argue that we should not hold up identification 
as a goal–even among ordinary people, even in deep conflicts—because it is dangerous and often 
harmful. 
2. 
I want to begin by showing how unsatisfactory all the specifications of empathy and 
identification are to an analytic philosopher.  Indeed, if I weren’t already quite familiar with the 
two states, the words these famous therapists use to spell them out would never help me see what 
they were talking about. 
Friemann begins spelling out the difference by quoting an early definition of Carl Rogers’: 
The state of empathy or being empathetic, is to perceive the internal frame of reference of 
another with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain 
thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ condition. Thus it 
means to sense the hurt or the pleasure of another as he senses it and to perceive the 
causes thereof as he perceives them, but without ever losing the recognition that it is as if 
I were hurt or pleased and so forth.  If this ‘as if’ quality is lost, then the state is one of 
identification (p.6). 
Friemann comments that “Here Rogers warns us three times not to lose the ‘as if’ condition 
or we will end up with identification” (p. 6). 
(A great deal will be made of this “as if” part (by Friemann, Rogers and others), but I find it 
seriously misleading. (I’ll try to show why near the end of this paper.)) 
When therapists identify with their clients, they are in a state of confusion. Some theorists 
think it’s a confusion of identities, others that it is a confusion of experience. 
The problem with identification is a “confusion of identity”: “A therapist is allowed to feel 
what his client feels as long as he realizes it is the client’s feeling that he is feeling.  In emotional 
identification, it appears that the therapist can’t make the distinction between his patient and 
himself” (p. 8). 
On p. 9 Friemann is discussing Arnett’s idea that it is irresponsible for therapists to identify 
with their clients.  Friemann says: “There doesn’t seem to be any irresponsibility in feeling what 
another feels while being aware that it is not your feeling.” 
(I think I know what Friemann is trying to get at, but it is hard to say it clearly. What could it 
possibly mean to feel what another feels while knowing it isn’t your feeling?  If I’m feeling it, 
then it is my feeling.  The words used are not helping.) 
With an air of making matters clearer, Friemann quotes two psychotherapists: 
. . . the therapist must be careful not to confuse his or her experience with that of the 
client’s or get lost in the client’s experience.  One is to enter the client’s experience on an 
“as if” basis but never to lose the sense of distinction between self and client. 
Friemann then comments: “The concept of experience is more limited than the concept of 
identity, so presumably one could become confused over whether or not an experience belonged 
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As Dave Barry would say: I am not making this up!   Taking the words at all literally, how 
would any of this work?  Suppose the therapist is in the midst of identifying with a client.  So we 
ask her, “Who are you?”  Would the therapist, having “a confusion of identity,” not know 
whether she was herself or someone else?  Or we ask, “Is this your own experience or your 
client’s?” Would the therapist, having a “confusion of experience,” not know whether it’s her 
own or someone else’s? 
The attempts to spell out empathy and identification and the differences between the two are 
almost unbelievably convoluted and confusing.  I don’t want to lay this at Friemann’s feet: all 
the specifications, by later theorists as well as Rogers, grope to characterize these states of minds 
in words that manifestly don’t do the job—at least not for anyone who is careful about language. 
3. 
 I think I know what Friemann, Rogers, and the other theorists are talking about when they 
try to spell out what identification and empathy are.  But I know this from previous acquaintance 
with the concepts in practice.  I don’t think that the words of Rogers or Friemann or anyone else 
in this debate would help me to understand the concepts if I did not understand them already. 
Here’s an example of identification in a therapeutic setting.  A man and a woman come to a 
therapist for marriage counseling.  The man describes how the woman “mistreated” him and how 
angry he is about it.  The therapist too becomes angry with the woman.  That’s a case of 
identification. 
The therapist is not “confusing” her identity or her experience with the man’s—we could 
describe it that way, but only by risking a lot of misunderstanding.  Nor is she really “getting 
lost” in the man’s feeling—though this description for me comes closer.  What she is doing has 
two aspects: one, she is feeling anger herself, and, two, there is something inappropriate about 
this.  She, the therapist, is angry, and it is inappropriate for her to actually be angry in this 
situation.  What’s more, she is angry with the woman.  It is directed anger. She is taking sides. 
She is not empathizing with both (whether both are present or not). 
The inappropriateness is a key part of what happens in identification, and it can take any 
number of forms.  You can see why Rogers and other theorists use such a convoluted description 
to capture identification: The therapist is angry, in this example, even though nothing has been 
done to her.  Any alleged mistreatment was done to the married man, not to the therapist.   
Experientially, the therapist’s anger is almost jolting in its inappropriateness.  We might 
wonder, “What’s she got to be angry about?  Nobody did anything to her!”  We might even 
conclude that the therapist has her own issues and that these are playing a major part in her 
reaction of anger.  Far from feeling his anger, she may well be projecting her own. 
With empathy, by contrast, the therapist wouldn’t be angry at all.  She would allow herself 
to see the situation as the man sees it; she would get hold of his perspective.  Now we can see 
why Rogers uses that “as if” description: he means that the therapist is not in fact angry at all; 
she is not feeling anger.  Rather, it is as if she is angry.  What does this mean? 
In empathizing with the husband, the therapist is able 
(a) to maintain her therapeutic distance, 
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(c) to realize how one could well have those feelings in this situation, and 
(d) to understand how having those feelings would be valid from his perspective. 
With empathy, the therapist could say, “Oh, I know what it feels like to be unfairly treated, 
and I know how a person could well feel unfairly treated in the circumstances you describe.”  
In addition, empathizing with the man allows her 
(e) to empathize also with the woman. 
Notice that in empathy there is a cognitive component that seems to be lacking in 
identification.  That is, in empathy there is a good deal of intellectual as well as emotional 
openness; there is a lot of thinking-things-through-from-the-other-person’s-perspective.  In 
identification, by contrast, any cognitive component (understanding intellectually what is going 
on) is likely to be overwhelmed by the emotions. 
In the therapist’s case, identification is inappropriate.  By becoming angry herself in 
response to the man’s story, her feelings and reactions are inappropriate in at least four ways.  
They are inappropriate with respect to beliefs she holds (the theoretical principles that guide her 
therapy); with respect to her role in relation to the conflict (she is a therapist, not a party to the 
conflict); with respect to the distance she should be maintaining; and they are inappropriate with 
respect to who she in fact is (she is not him—she is not the person who was mistreated). 
Friemann clearly recognizes that identification is inappropriate for the therapist.  The 
question is: Is it similarly inappropriate to identify with someone in a non-therapeutic context, 
specifically when two people are engaged in deep conflict? 
4. 
Friemann maintains that identification is extremely unlikely in cases of deep conflict.  That 
is part of his reason for thinking that it’s not really a danger in such situations. Since it’s virtually 
unachievable, it can function as an ideal.  If I am in deep conflict with you, the ideal would be to 
identify with you—to “feel your feelings” (without the buffering “as if”), and thus feel the full 
impact of your side. 
I’m not so sure that identification is as uncommon in deep conflicts as Friemann thinks it is.  
He might be right if strong emotions followed a logical course of action.  If fascism and 
communism were purely sets of beliefs, we would not see people go from one to the other 
without passing through all those more centrist political views that lie between them.  In fact, 
though, “flip-flopping” from fascism to communism is not all that unusual.  It is far more usual 
than passing from fascism to conservatism to liberalism to communism. 
Linda Lovelace became a born-again Christian.  So did Saul of Tarsus. Raging death-penalty 
advocates and raging death-penalty opponents sometimes flip to the other side, displaying their 
fervor now for the side they were just ragefully against. Ronald Reagan went from socialist to 
right-winger without going through the intermediate stages. 
Strong emotions don’t necessarily follow a gradual path when they change.  People involved 
in deep conflict–where there is a heavy commitment of emotion to the exclusive righteousness of 
their own side and the utter wrongness of the other side—can easily flip-flop. (I’m not, of course, 
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It’s partly the result, I think, of the extremity of the emotions involved.  Suppose I relish 
strong emotions; I attach them to my own point of view exclusively; and I am in deep conflict 
with you on the other side.  Then I find something unexpectedly “wrong” with my own position 
(or something unexpectedly “right” with yours).  There is nothing especially impossible about 
flipping totally to your side.  That is how conversion often works. 
I believe identification plays a big role in this. At least, it is one common mechanism by 
which people flip from one extreme viewpoint to the opposite. Saul identifies with a Christ he’s 
been persecuting; the death-penalty advocate sees “Dead Man Walking” and identifies with the 
criminal’s anguish; the death-penalty opponent suddenly identifies with a murder victim. 
Empathy produces a more measured reaction.  Since it allows people to keep their distance 
while understanding another’s feelings, and since it allows an empathetic understanding even of 
opposing sides, it doesn’t lend itself so readily to flipping sides. (An empathetic Saul would say 
something a lot less extreme than the identifying Saul:  “Ah. I see how unpleasant it must be to 
be persecuted, and I now see how your actions seem appropriate to you, given that you believe 
you’ve discovered the true faith.  From now on, I’m not only going to stop persecuting 
Christians, I’m going to stop telling people how they ought to live.”) 
5. 
Finally, I want to maintain that identification retains its inappropriateness even in non-
therapeutic settings, even when parties are in deep conflict. 
Suppose A and B are getting divorced—and they are in deep conflict.  Each believes the 
other would be an unhealthy parent for their daughter.  Each wants custody.  Each is furious at 
the other.  (I’ve included three states of mind: a belief, a want, and an emotion–in fact a directed 
emotion.)  
This is deep conflict. Part of what makes it deep is the conviction that the other parent would 
be bad for the daughter. You can see why Friemann thinks identification is unlikely in such a 
situation. But I would argue that, likely or not, it still would not be beneficial—precisely because 
of the inappropriateness that accompanies identification. 
It would be inappropriate for A to “take on” any one of those states of mind.  Consider the 
belief. Given that A believes B would be a bad parent, A should certainly not identify with B and 
take on the belief that B would be a good parent.  That would be to abandon, without reason, A’s 
previous belief. 
 Similarly, A should not identify with B to the extent of taking on her want. B, after all, 
wants custody.  Identifying with that want amounts to A’s abandoning A’s own want (and his 
belief as well). 
Finally, it make no sense for A to identify with B’s emotion.  B is furious: it would not help 
the conflict for A to feel furious.  And it would involve great self-abandonment for A to be 
furious at himself. 
None of these helps with conflict resolution.  And none of them is appropriate. None of 
these constitutes the “ideal” that Friemann depicts. 









A should empathize with B.  The empathy maintains a distance while still allowing A to see 
and understand the situation as B sees it.  Or at least—and here’s that “as if” again—A, while 
remaining A, should feel the validity for B of how B sees things. By empathizing, A can start to 
understand how B could see A as a bad parent.  A can be (as Friemann insightfully stresses) 
emotionally and intellectually open to B’s beliefs—but without the self-abandonment of taking 
them on himself.  Similarly, empathizing can reveal to A how B’s want (to have custody), and 
even her fury at him, make sense—from her perspective. 
6. 
Finally, at the back of Friemann’s thesis, I think, is the belief that there is a continuum 
running from empathy to identification—in the sense that both are ways of helping parties “more 
adequately understand the emotional aspects of the conflict” (p. 1).  Identification would allow 
this understanding to a significantly greater degree than empathy would. 
I think Friemann is led down this path by the confusing way Rogers and others speak about 
identification and empathy.  When A identifies with B, these theorists say, A feels B’s feelings; 
A confuses himself and his experiences with B and her experiences.  This sounds as though A is 
getting in touch with B’s feelings in a singularly profound way—A is actually feeling B’s 
feelings himself! 
But I don’t think this is so.  People, of course, can’t really feel other people’s anger.  That’s 
just a confusing façon de parler. All A can feel is A’s own anger: obviously.  In the case of 
identification, A’s anger is triggered by hearing B’s story, by seeing how much B is hurting.  A 
feels anger (A’s own anger, remember), even though nothing has been done to A. That’s 
confused; that’s inappropriate. 
What happens in identification is that A imaginatively places himself in B’s situation, and 
that triggers A’s own mechanisms of anger. Far from bringing A and B closer together, 
identification is far more likely to be a result of projection. 
I have argued that empathy and identification are different in kind. Empathy allows distance 
to remain.  Identification does not.  Empathy is cognitive: it is, partly at least, aimed at 
cognitively understanding the other.  Identification is not: the effect of identification is to be 
feeling strong emotions, without much cause.  In identification, a person abandons her own 
beliefs, desires, and emotions—even her identity—and “takes on” those of another.  This is 
inappropriate whether she is a therapist or a party to a deep conflict. 
 
 
